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NOTES
RULE BY MARTIAL LAW IN INDIANA: THE SCOPE OF
EXECUTIVE POWER
Use of the military to handle domestic crisis is a common technique
of state government. The military forces of the State of Indiana have
been called out for state duty on over thirty occasions in the last forty
years,' and in at least seven instances during this period the governor has
declared areas of the state to be under military control.2 Although mar-
tial law is not mentioned in the Indiana Constitution, nor dealt with by
any Indiana statute,' it is obviously no stranger to the state. Because
of the inherent nature of the military as an instrument of war, its em-
ployment in civil disorders has led to considerable confusion between the
powers of a military commander on the battlefield and his powers at the
scene of a domestic disturbance. The confusion has been compounded
by the notion that plenary powers may be vested in the military by a
governor's proclamation. Despite the frequent reliance of the state ex-
ecutive on martial law in dealing with civil disorder the limitations on the
power of the executive to subordinate civil authority to the military and
the legal boundaries of military operations under a proclamation of
1. Survey of instances reported in YEAR BOOK OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, vols.
1920-1950. Twelve occasions involved fires, floods, tornadoes and other natural disasters.
Thirteen instances involved labor troubles. The troops were used for a miscellany of
purposes in the remaining instances, e.g., policing the burial of a notorious criminal,
1935 YEAR BOOK OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 36; convoying discharged service men home
for Christmas, 1945 YEAR BOOK OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1215.
2. In 1919, at East Chicago and Indiana Harbor (labor dispute), 1920 YEAR BOOK
OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 226-231; in 1922 in Clay County (labor dispute), 1922 id. at
818; in 1932 in Vigo County (labor dispute), 1932 id. at 969; in 1933 in Sullivan County
(labor dispute), 1934 id. at 33; in 1935 in Vigo County (labor dispute), Cox v. McNutt,
12 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ind. 1935), compare 1936 YEAR-BOOK OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 34;
in 1937 in the Ohio River Valley flood areas, 1937 id. at 90; in 1955 in Henry and
Wayne Counties, see note 16 infra.
3. The phrase "martial law" appears in one statute dealing with jurisdiction of courts
martial over state troops. IND. ANN. STAT. § 45-2201 (Burns Supp. 1955). The term
has been justifiably criticized as obscure. FAIRMAN, LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 19-21 (2d
ed. 1943). However, its dominance in lay and legal parlance makes acceptance of any
other terminology seem hopeless. The trouble lies in the fact that "martial law" has
been employed to cover the entire spectrum of use of military for civil purposes, from
total subversion of civil government to selling tickets at football games. FAIRMAN, Op. cit.
supra at 80-94. "Martial law" is herein used to denote the substitution of military rule
for civil law and government.
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martial law are not generally understood.' The most recent instance of
such a proclamation in Indiana illustrates the legal problems arising out
of use of the military to deal with civil disturbance, and points up the
confusion surrounding them.
On October 5, 1955, a dispute between management of the Perfect
Circle Foundry in New Castle, Indiana, and the United Automobile
Workers Union culminated in armed violence.' A riot between massed
pickets and non-striking workers resulted in the wounding of several
persons. Cars were stoned and overturned; a building was set afire.6
Violence subsided only after pleas for peace were made by labor leaders
and the lieutenant governor of the state. State police were allowed to
disarm workers within the plant and escort them through picket lines.'
The mayor of New Castle immediately declared an emergency to
exist within the city and petitioned the governor for assistance from the
National Guard.' The governor authorized assistance and ordered the
4. E.g, "Efforts should be taken to bring about a recognized legal status for action
that must be taken by the military under Martial Law conditions. Great study should be
given for the reasons for the inaction of the Circuit Court in Henry County [see p. 460
infrl] and the legal profession in Indiana and the General Assembly of Indiana should
be asked to study the problem with the hope that a solution for future operations will
be forthcoming." After Action Report from Col. H.S. Wilcox, Ind. N.G. (Commanding
Officer at New Castle) to the Adjutant General of Indiana, Oct. 28, 1955, on file in the
office of the Adjutant General of Indiana. The author is indebted to Col. John W.
McConnell, NGUS, Assistant Adjutant General, State of Indiana, for access to the
collection of very detailed records and documents concerning the New Castle incident
on file in the Adjutant General's office. Citations to the collection will hereafter be
labeled "AG files."
5. The strike commenced on July 24, 1955 at the expiration of the Perfect Circle-
UAW contract. Negotiations had broken down on the question of union shop. Despite
an order by the Circuit Court for Randolph County enjoining mass picketing, the
foundry was the scene of intermittent bursts of violence throughout August and Sep-
tember. Cars were stoned and overturned; workers seeking entry to the plant were
threatened and manhandled. Although the foundry management tried to maintain limited
operations, it was forced to shut down completely in mid-September. The plant remained
inoperative until September 27, when a force of New Castle police removed pickets
from the gates. Detailed chronological account of the development and progress of the
strike is contained in an undated brochure, Labor Relations History-Perfect Circle
Corporation, AG files.
6. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1955, p. 1, col. 7.
7. Ibid.
8. "I, Paul F. McCormack, Mayor of the City of New Castle, Indiana do hereby
declare a state of emergency existant within the city. And that to assure safety of life
and property and to obtain law and order, it is necessary to have National Guardsman
called in to meet the situation and restore complete order.
"I hereby request the governor of the State of Indiana, Honorable George N. Craig,
to send National Guardsmen to New Castle, Indiana." Proclamation by the Mayor of the
City of New Castle, Indiana, Oct. 5, 1955, AG files. Whatever its political value, such
a proclamation is not a prerequisite to a call out of the guard. The evaluation and
decision lie wholly with the governor, and he may order up the troops without a request
from local authorities. IND. ANN. STAT. § 45-2104 (Burns Supp. 1955). If an emergency
demands, commanding officers of the National Guard units in the vicinity may order
458 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Guard mobilized.9 Instructions to the National Guard made it clear that
the military was to operate in aid of and in strict subordination to the
civil authorities in New Castle.'" The troops arrived in the city in force
the next morning. For the next four days, the National Guard worked
in close conjunction with the New Castle authorities, subject to the direc-
tion of the mayor."
The Guard set up road blocks around the city, searched automobiles,
and confiscated firearms and liquor. 2 They established an armed guard
around the foundry, which had been closed on October 6 by the mayor. 3
They maintained continuous roving patrols throughout the city, enforc-
ing the 9:00 P.M. curfew and the ban on liquor sales ordered by the
mayor."4 Although instances of violence and vandalism had become
common in New Castle during the development of the labor dispute,
out their troops on written request of the sheriff of the county without waiting for the
governor's order. IND. ANN. STAT. -§ 45-2106 (Burns Supp. 1955).
9. The governor was out of the state at the time and communicated his orders by
telephone. This complication led to anxiety in the Adjutant General's office, because the
lieutenant-governor vigorously opposed sending out the troops and maintained that the
decision was with him. Memorandum from Capt. W. A. Scott, Executive for the
Adjutant General, to Governor George N. Craig, Oct. 8, 1955, AG files; N.Y. Times,
Oct. 7, 1955, p. 1, col. 7. There was strong.feeling that the governor shed his executive
power when he left the territory of the state, and thus could not act in his official
capacity outside the state's perimeter. Editorial, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 7, 1955, p. 24,
col. 1; statement of the Attorney General of Indiana, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 7, 1955,
p. 1, col. 1; Indianapolis Star, Oct. 8, 1955, p. 1, col. 7.
10. Letter of instructions from Headquarters, 38th Infantry Division, to Command-
ing Officer, Indiana Command Central, 38th Infantry Division, Oct. 5, 1955, AG files.
11. Ibid.; Indianapolis Star, Oct. 7, 1955, p. 1, col. 1.
12. Memorandum report by Col. W. C. Phillippi, Ind. N.G., Oct. 10, 1955, A.G. files.
13. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1955, p. 52, col. 5; Indianapolis Star, Oct. 7, 1955, p. 1, col. 1.
The mayor himself voiced considerable doubt as to the legality of this action. Indian-
apolis Star, Oct. 8, 1955, p. 1, col. 2. The Attorney General of Indiana also questioned
the legality of the order, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 8, 1955, p. 1, col. 8, and since he felt
that the troops were illegally in New Castle, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 9, 1955, p. 1, col. 1;
see note 9 supra, feared the state might be liable to suit by anyone damaged by the
presence of troops. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 7, 1955, p. 3, col. 3. It would appear, however,
that without its consent the state is immune from such suit. Ford Motor Company v.
Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945) ; State ex rel. Indiana Depart-
ment of Conservation v. Pulaski Circuit Court, 231 Ind. 245, 108 N.E.2d 185 (1952).
14. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 6, 1955, p. 12, col. 3. The legality of the mayor's action
is subject to question on two grounds. Although there is statutory provision for emergency
publication of city ordinances by the mayor, such ordinances must still be enacted by the
city council. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-1406, 48-1407 (Burns 1950). Moreover, while
there appears to be no constitutional right to sell liquor in Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 12-443 (Burns Supp. 1953); State ex rel. Zeller v. Montgomery Circuit Court, 223
Ind. 476, 62 N.E.2d 149 (1945), the curfew raises serious problems of state infringement
on personal liberties. Although curfews may be valid, a strong showing of necessity is
required to make them so. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943).
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there were none reported during this period. 5 Order was effectively
restoied.
On October 10, however, when a meeting of officials of the foun-
dry and the UAW with the governor failed to establish a basis for the
resumption of negotiations, the governor proclaimed a state of emer-
gency to exist in New Castle and Henry County, designated the county
as a military district, and declared it to be under military control. The
proclamation forbade assembly within the district, limited ingress and
egress to the county, and purported to make the civil authority an agency
of the military."
Despite the broad powers conferred on the National Guard by the
governor's proclamation, the military did not find it necessary to greatly
expand its scope of operations. The area guarded by road blockades was
15. The some fifty instances of violence and vandalism which terrorized both
factions in New Castle during the two months prior to the Guard's arrival are itemized
in an undated pamphlet, Chronology of Incidents Related to P.C. Strike, New Castle
Foundry, AG files.
16. "WHEREAS, an emergency has arisen in and around the City of New Castle,
Henry County, Indiana, by reason of violence and other breaches of the peace occuring
in connection with a strike at the Perfect Circle Factory in said city
"NOW, THEREFORE, acting by virtue of the power and authority conferred
upon me as Governor of the State of Indiana, and as Commander-in-Chief of the
military and naval forces of the State of Indiana, it is ordered that the National Guard
of Indiana assume control of the following described territory: All of the territory
lying within the boundaries of Henry County, Indiana.
"Said territory is hereby designated as a military district and, until further order
and notice, is under military control.
"It is the purpose of the military control that the military authorities conduct the
affairs of this district in cooperation with the civil authorities, which shall become, until
further order, an agency of the military authorities.
"The following notice is given to all persons in the district herein designated as
being under military control.
1. No assembly will be permitted in the district.
2. No persons, other than the police, of the City of New Castle, Henry County,
Indiana, the county sheriff and his duly appointed deputies, members of the State
police, military authorities and troops will be permitted to carry arms or weapons of
any kind or description.
3. No persons, other than those authorized by the military authorities will be
permitted ingress or egress to or from the district.
4. All crowds, picketers and other assemblage will disperse immediately, except
as authorized by existing court order.
"The military authorities, troops and all civil peace officers are charged with the
carrying out of these orders, which will be rigidly enforced.
"All persons within the limits of the district are admonished to observe and strictly
comply with these instructions.
"Any person having a petition to present or complaint to make will present it to the
commanding officer of said district for his consideration." Proclamation by George N.
Craig, Governor of the State of Indiana, Oct. 10, 1955, copy on file in Indiana Law
Journal office. This follows the form of prior documents purporting to establish martial
law in Indiana. See e.g., Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355, 357 (S.D. Ind. 1935). The
sites of other Perfect Circle plants were placed under military control by separate
proclamations designating Hagerstown and a section of Richmond, Indiana as military
districts. Copies on file in Indiana Law Journal office.
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slightly increased, and roving patrols continued to enforce the existing
curfew and alcoholic beverage restrictions."7 Liquor,"8 arms, and am-
munition 0 were forbidden sale and were confiscated. Several boot-
leggers and curfew violators were arrested.2" The number of troops in
the area was gradually reduced during this period,2' and only a skeleton
force was left to aid the civil authorities after the governor terminated
military control.22
Although the governor's proclamation led to very little change in the
military's policing activities in the area, it had a profound effect on the
local civil government. The circuit judge for Henry County immedi-
ately abdicated his bench and refused to hold court, on the ground that
neither he nor his court had any legal status during military control of
the county.22 This action met with considerable opposition from the
local bar association, whose members believed that any question of juris-
diction might be overcome by waivers from all parties to the litigation."
17. The 9:00 P.M. curfew was relaxed by the military on October 15. Curfew for
persons over eighteen was extended to midnight; all others were to be off the streets
at 10:30 P.M. Proclamation from Commanding Officer, Indiana Command Central,
to all residents, Oct. 15, 1955, AG files.
18. Proclamation from Commanding Officer, Indiana Command Central, Oct. 14,
1955, AG files.
19. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 17, 1955, p. 1, col. 2.
20. Periodic Operations Report No. 8, Oct. 17, 1955 from Indiana Command Central;
Periodic Operations Report No. 9, Oct. 18, 1955 from Indiana Command Central, AG
files (bootleggers). Periodic Operations Report No. 10, Oct. 19, 1955 from Indiana
Command Central; Periodic Operations Report No. 11, Oct. 20, 1955, AG files (curfew
violators).
21. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 17, 1955, p. 1, col. 1; Indianapolis Star, Oct. 19, 1955, p.
1, col. 2.
22. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 26, 1955, p. 24, col. 4.
23. The Henry Circuit judge, assuming the legality of military control over the
county, reasoned that the governor's proclamation abolished the legal status of judge and
court within the area. Therefore, by virtue of the proclamation, the court no longer
existed, and it could not in light of the constitutional provision that the military shall
be kept in strict subordination to the civil power, IND. CONST. art. 1, § 33, be reincarnated
by order or sufferance of the military. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 13, 1955, p. 3, col. 1.
This action created a serious problem for one seeking judicial review of actions taken by
the military after a proclamation of martial law. The venue for suits against public
officers for acts done by virtue of office is the county where the cause arose. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-702 (Burns 1946) ; see 2 GAvIT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACticE §§ 207-208
(1942). If actions against the military fall into this category, it would seem that no
action could commence until martial law had terminated. Even the writ of habeas corpus
might be unavailable, for jurisdiction to grant the writ is limited to the county in which
the petitioner is restrained. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1905 (Burns 1946) ; State ex reL. Moore
v. Carlin, 226 Ind. 437, 81 N.E.2d 670 (1948). There is no original jurisdiction in the
Indiana Supreme Court to grant the writ. Jones v. Dowd, 219 Ind. 114, 37 N.E.2d 68
(1941).
24. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 18, 1955, p. 13, col. 3. The President of the Indiana
Bar Association suggested an action for mandate to compel the court to hear docketed
cases. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 15, 1955, p. 1, col. 5. Ordinarily a judge has a legal duty
to hold court, and may be compelled to execute that duty by mandate. State ex rel.
Devening v. Bartholemew, 176 Ind. 182, 95 N.E. 417 (1911) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-2201,
NOTES
The court was reopened on October 20 on that basis, 5 and military con-
trol of the county was terminated by the governor the same date.2"
Under normal conditions the action taken by the military in Henry
County would not have been tolerated. Individual rights secured by
both state and federal constitutions were invaded. The right to bear
arms," to peacefully assemble,2" to be secure against unreasonable search
and seizures"5 were restricted by the military. Merchants properly
3-2202 (Burns Supp. 1955). Thus it would at least seem possible through an action
for mandate to compel the circuit court to rule on its own jurisdiction, allowing the issue
to be taken up on appeal. Moreover, the status of the civil courts under an executive
declaration of martial law might be adjudicated in the mandate action itself. Unfortu-
nately this avenue of judicial review was not followed.
25. The circuit judge was still doubtful as to whether the court could legally
function but agreed to handle all probate matters, dispose of all default situations in
the usual manner, and hear contested litigation on the condition that all parties agree
to the court's jurisdiction and waive any future attack on that point. Indianapolis Star,
Oct. 20, 1955, p, 1, col. 4.
It is urged below that jurisdiction of the civil courts cannot be suspended by a state
governor's proclamation. See p. 466 in-fra. But assuming the proclamation to have that
effect, the question of waiver of the jurisdictional defect still remains. It has been
maintained that a judgment rendered after an adversary proceeding is not subjcet to a
collateral attack based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter in the original
action. 2 GAvrT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRAcTIcE § 184(e) (1942). The same authority
further urges that the question may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at §
184(c). But the effect of a waiver of jurisdiction over the subject matter would seem
to vary with the nature of the jurisdiction sought to be waived. Each case depends on a
balancing of the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata with the policy against
permitting a court to act beyond its jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942).
In a recent case, the parties in the trial court agreed to permit the trial judge, whose
term of office had expired, to continue the case. On appeal, the Appellate Court on its
own motion held that the parties could not confer jurisdiction to hear the case on a
person with no legal status. Macy v. Logansport Machine Co., - Ind. App. - ,
101 N.E.2d 715 (1951). This holding was superceded by the Indiana Supreme Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court without comment on the jurisdictional
point. Macy v. Logansport Machine Co., 232 Ind. 270, 111 N.E.2d 717 (1953). It would
appear, therefore, that Indiana will give effect to waiver of certain types of jurisdiction
over subject matter. Surely the policy behind preventing a court from acting beyond
its jurisdiction under a state of martial law could not concern litigation totally uncon-
cerned with martial law. If the court and judge would normally have jurisdiction over
the cause, and all litigants agree to that jurisdiction, no policy is furthered by denying
them jurisdiction by dint of executive declaration. Allowing the question of jurisdiction
over civil cases to be waived presents no compelling problem of competency, convenience,
or sovereignty.
26. Proclamation by George N. Craig, Governor of the State of Indiana, Oct. 20,
1955, copy of file in Indiana Law Journal office.
27. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 32; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See note 16 supra.
28. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 31; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See note 16 supra.
29. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 11; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See note 16 supra.
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authorized by statute and license to sell liquor" or firearms" were for-
bidden to do business. The statutory right of properly licensed persons
to carry concealed weapons was denied. 2 Orderly civil process was sup-
planted by military government. Although in fact the military was con-
scious of an obligation to act temperately,33 and the measures taken to
police the area appear mild, the moderation employed in the New Castle
operation resulted from practical rather than legal considerations. The
uncertainty of the military as to its status and powers under the gover-
nor's proclamation doubtless had some effect in tempering its actions."
Yet far harsher measures were designed and held in abeyance pending
the development of an apparent necessity for them. The military
planned, and apparently considered itself empowered, to try civilians by
military tribunal, suspend the right to the writ of habeas corpus, trial by
jury, change of venue and release on bond." The implication is that
under a martial law declaration, action taken by the military is limited
only by its own determination of the practical necessities of the situa-
tion. If so, this raises the phenomenon of an executive empowered to
suspend the laws and constitution of a state by fiat.
The basic legal problem is this. If an emergency permits the state
executive to substitute military force for civil law, then there can be legal
responsibility for actions taken by the military only if the circumstances
which provoked the executive's decision do not meet the judicial defi-
nition of emergency. Judicial review is directed to the question of
whether an emergency initially existed, which can be answered only by
30. Although in Indiana there is no property right in a liquor license, the authority
to issue, suspend, or revoke permits is clearly given the Alcoholic Beverage Commission,
and no other. IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-443 (Burns Supp. 1953). Absolute discretion is
vested only in the Commission. Apparently the Alcoholic Beverage Commission was also
unaware of the extent of its authority in the New Castle area, for it aquiesced in the
ban on liquor sales. Statement by Headquarters, Indiana Command Central, Oct. 14, 1955,
AG files.
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4742 (Burns 1933).
32. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4738 (Burns Supp. 1953). There is no constitutional
right to carry concealed weapons in Indiana. McIntyre v. State, 170 Ind. 163, 83 N.E.
1005 (1908) ; State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833).
33. "The troop commander has been instructed that he will accomplish this mission
as expeditiously as possible; however, there will be no effort to supersede civil authority
unless it breaks down. The occupation and policing of the areas designated will be
accomplished at the least possible inconvenience to the civil populace. No undue encroach-
ment of inherent civil rights will be imposed." Public statement of H.A. Dougherty,
Major General, Ind. N.G., Adjutant General, (no date, but made sometime after the
governor's proclamation), AG files.
34. See notes 4 and 33 supra.
35. Special Orders, No. X, Headquarters, Indiana Command Central, New Castle,
Indiana (no date), AG files. This order was filed with the Adjutant General on Oct.
19, 1955, but was never dated, numbered or signed. It was prepared for a contingency
that never developed.
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defining limits of the -concept of emergency. Erriphasis is thus placed
on the question of the legality of the governor's decision, rather than: the
legality of actions taken by the 'Military on the premises. Although- this
theory has its advocates, " it is hardly an effective legal approach. Its
rigidity creates too broad a power in the military, for once the courts
decide that an emergency permitting the suspension of the laws exists,
actions patently arbitrary and unrelated to the crisis are conferred im-
munity from litigation. On the other hand, insistence that normal rou-
tines must prevail until an emergency is reached too narrowly constricts
executive action under circunstances serious but not yet constituting an
emergency. It denies the existence of any middle ground between nor-
mality and crisis.
Proponents of the proposition that the governor of a state may by
his ipse dixit suspend the protection of the laws dver the citizens of a
state by a proclamation of martial law argue by analogy from the tradi-
tionally broad powers of the executive to conduct war." The institutional
history of martial law in England lends some support to the position that
in time of war the king can dispense with the common law and rule 15y
royal discretion. The term "martial law" itself apparently .stems from
a medieval court composed of the king's highest military officers and
empowered to administer drum-head justice on the battlefield."8 - At-
tempts to increase the scope of this court's power were blocked by the
36. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909). This opinion indicates that the gov-
ernor's declaration of an insurrection is sufficient to confer legality on actions taken
under it. Moreover, it implies that so long as the declaration was made in good faith,
it is not subject to attack in the courts. See WIENER, PRACTICAL. MANUAL OF MARTIAL
LAW 109-110 (1940); FAIRMAN, LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 101 (2d ed. 1943).
37. U.S. ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer 280 Fed. (D. Neb. 1922); U.S. ex rel.
McMaster v. Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (S.D. Texas 1920); Ex parte Jones, 71 W.Va.
567, 77 N.E. 1029 (1913) ; State v. Brown, 71 W.Va. 519, 77 N.E. 243 (1912).
38. This was the Court of Constable and Marshall. Holdsworth, Martial Law
Historically Considered, 18 L.Q. REv. 117 (1902) ; FAIRmAN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 1-6.
See also MORRIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND TO 1216, at 329 (1930). The
origins of this court are obscure, but are probably to be found in the older court of
Steward and Marshall. 3 SAYLES, SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER
EDWARD I, lxxxiii-lxxxviii (58 Selden Society 1939). This court appears to have de-
veloped from the curia regis of the Angevin kings but did not develop along common
law lines. Id. at lxxxviii. It was a special target of the reaction against the decay of
legal order in medieval England. E.g., Articles on the Charters, 1300, 28 EDW. 1, stat. 3,
c. 3; The New Ordinances, 1311, 5 EDw. 2, c. 26; see also JOLLIFE, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 409-430 (2d ed. 1948). Perhaps the limitations on the
court of Steward and Marshall led to the exercise of similar jurisdiction through the court
of Constable and Marshall, or perhaps growing legal sophistication demanded a sharper
jurisdictional differentiation between the two. At any rate, the latter court became a
greater source of discontent during the reign of Richard 11. 8 RICH. 2, c. 5 (1384);
13 RICH. 2, stat. 1, c. 2 (1389).
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incipient English tenderness for legality,30 and by the. Seventeenth Cen-
tury, jurisdictional strictures had led to the court's atrophy." It had
early been made clear that rule by martial law, although occasioned by
war, was not justified merely because a state of war existed." It could
be invoked only when it became impossible for the organs of the common
law to function." The 'struggle between Charles I and Parliament made
it apparent that martial law was not an adjunct of the royal prerogative
of discretion in the manner of making war, for the attempt of Charles
to rule the southeast coast of England by royal commissioners during
the Thirty Years War met with stern rebuff. 3 Parliament made it clear
that the king had no power to suspend the operation of the laws within
the realm, even during wartime.44 The king had broad powers to con-
duct war, but these powers were vested in him by the common law. It
was one thing to say that the common law permitted the king extreme
emergency powers; it was quite another to say that the king could
suspend the common law. 5 The former position implied ultimate re-
sponsibility of the king to Parliament as the arbiter of governmental
power; the latter urged that the reigns of power were ultimately with the
king. Rule by martial law was not, therefore, an incident of the king's
war powers. Only where raging warfare made it physically impossible
for the machinery of the common law to function did the demand for
some sort of order and government allow rule by law martial to be
tolerated."
39. 8 RIcH. 2, c. 5 (1384) ; 13 RICH. 2, stat. 1, c. 2 (1389). Compare 2 RIcH. 2,
stat. 2, c. 2 (1378), repealing 2 RicH. 2, stat. 1, c. 6 (1378) which allowed the arrest
and incarceration of rioters by king's commissioners without process of law. See also
3 SAYLES, op. cit. supra note 38, at lxxxviii.
40. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 36 (4th ed. 1779) ; 3 BLACKSTONE, COU-
MENTARIES *103-4; Holdsworth, szpra note 38, at 118.
41. Its jurisdiction was over "things that touch war within the realm, which cannot
be discussed by the common law." 13 RICH. 2, stat. 1, c. 2 (1389). See also 8 RICH. 2, c. 5
(1384).
42. HALE, HISTORY OF THE Co1MoN LAW 34-36 (4th ed. 1779).
43. Petition of Right, 1623, 3 CHAS. 1, C. 1.
44. Interpretations of the precise legal effect of the Petition of Right differ widely.
FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 9-18; Holdsworth, supra note 38, at 120-121; Dodd,
The Case of Marais, 18 L.Q. REv. 143, 147-51 (1902) ; RELF, THE PETITION OF RIGHT,
iii (1917). It is clear, however, that considered in its historical context, the Petition was
a declaration of the sentiment in Parliament that the king had no power to suspend
the operation of the common law over his subjects. This was the attitude of the leading
contemporary lawyers. HALF, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 35 (4th ed. 1779) ; see
FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 16.
45. "[T]he pretended power of suspending of laws or the execution of laws by
regal authority without consent of parliament is illegal; . . . the pretended power of
dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal authority, as it has been assumed
and exercised of late, is illegal. . . ." Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 WM. & MARY, stat. 2, c. 2.
46. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COmmON LAW 35-36 (4th ed. 1779).
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The limits of the power of the President of the United States to
conduct war have never been precisely defined." That they are bioad in
scope can not be denied. But the Supreme Court has never admitted
that the chief executive might suspend the operation of the laws in such
a manner as to deny the courts jurisdiction to decide the legality of action
taken under the suspension.4" This explains the tenacious judicial em-
phasis on the distinction between suspension of the writ of habeas cor-
pus and suspension of the privilege of the writ.49 Although the courts
may deny a prisoner release because the privilege of the writ has been
suspended, they will not refuse him a judicial hearing on the legitimacy
of his detention. Ultimately the courts must have the final word on the
legality of the chief executive's actions. However broad the war powers
of the President may be, they do not encompass the power to close the
courts of the United States. Over-emphasis on the courts' natural re-
luctance to interfere with executive action in time of war may lead to
the position that war powers are unlimited. 0 But allowing broad scope
to the executive's power to conduct war, while retaining the ultimate
right to review the occasion for the use of that power, is not to say that
the war power is without limits. The existence of an institution which
has the power to declare certain exercise of war power ultra vires must
exert at least a cautionary function. The Supreme Court has never
considered itself subject to suspension, by either the President or
Congress.
Martial law, defined as a suspension of the law of a nation by ex-
ecutive proclamation, was not a power of the king under common law,
nor is it a power of the President of the United States. Although it is
arguable that the English Parliament holds that power,5' it is obvious
that the power of Congress is more limited. The law of the United
47. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646-47 (1951)
(concurring opinion). See also CoRwIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 275-318
(3d ed. 1948) ; ROsSITER, THE SUPREMa COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (1951).
48. E.g., President Roosevelt attempted by proclamation to close the courts to
German saboteurs apprehended in the United States. The Supreme Court took no heed.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942), discussed in Mason, Inter Arna Silent Leges:
Chief Justice Stone's Views, 69 HARV. L. R-v. 806, 828 (1956).
49. E.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130-31 (1866). See WIENER,
PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAw 68-72 (1940).
50. RosslTER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHiEF 131 (1951);
RossiTEa, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 286-87 (1948); cf. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS 317-18 (3d ed. 1948). This view would seem to demand radical
revision in the light of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1951),
which declared unconstitutional a presidential seizure of a steel plant during the
Korean War.
51. See Corvin, Martial Law, Yesterday and Today, 47 PoL. Sci. Q. 103 (1932);
FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 20-21.
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States is not only statutory, but constitutional. The law of the separate
states in addition rests on the norms of the state constitutions. Although
the power relationship between state governor, judiciary, and legislature
rests primarily on the state constitution, and thus would seem a question
for the state rather than the federal judiciary, it would appear that action
by a state executive claiming justification under war powers presents a
federal question. Even if the war powers of the President encompass
the power to rule by martial law, the state governments were divested of
similar powers by virtue of the Federal Constitution. 2 The states are
therein denied the power to wage war. This aspect of sovereignty with
its concommitant powers is no longer a state power. It is therefore im-
possible for a governor's rule by martial law to be explained as deriving
from his war powers. Furthermore, the incidents provoking state ex-
ecutives to attempt to govern by martial law have little resemblance to
war.53 Martial law has most frequently been called down to quell labor
disputes.54 But strikes, even when accompanied by armed violence, are
not war.5" They display no aspect of struggle between sovereigns. They
have no resemblance to situations demanding the application of war
powers. Unreviewable executive legislation exercised by martial law
tan be tolerated, if at all, only in the face of an actual threat to the
sovereignty or constitutional structure of a nation. 8 Although labor
disorders often reflect resistance to the execution of the laws, they rarely
pose a direct threat to the political structure of the state. Considerable
force may be required to overcome the lawlessness engendered by the
labor dispute, but force should halt when that point is reached. Resolu-
tion of labor difficulties should be left to those organs of civil govern-
ment specially created for this function."
A state governor's attempt to rule by martial law presents questions
for both state and federal judiciary. As it affects the governmental
relationship between state executive, legislature, and judiciary, martial
law is primarily a question of the interpretation of the state constitution.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 10. Cf. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90
(1883) ; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 48, 71-79 (1849) (dissenting opinion).
See FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 121-24.
53. Generally, see WIENER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 81-102; FAIRMAN, Op. cit. supra
note 36, at 80-94; Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1921).
54. Labor disputes prompted six out of the seven declarations of martial law in
Indiana since 1920. See note 2 supra. See also Isseks, The Executive and His Use of the
Militia, 16 ORE. L. REv. 301 (1937) ; Comment, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 314.
55. See WIENER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 28-35.
56. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 298 (1948).
57. The Perfect Circle-UAW dispute was before the National Labor Relations
Board at the time martial law was declared. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1955, p. 20, col. 7.
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The Constitution of the State of Indiana provides for a tri-partite gov-
ernment.5" The governor, as commander-in-chief of the military forces
of the state, may call out the troops to execute the laws, suppress insur-
rection, or repel invasion. But the constitution warns that the military
must be kept in strict subordination to the civil power,6" that all courts
shall be open,6 and that the operation of the laws shall never be suspended
except by the authority of the General Assembly.62 Whatever doubts
might exist as to the prerogative of the executive to rule by martial law
would seem to be dispelled by this last stipulation. It follows the tradi-
tional language of Anglo-American constitutional documents excoriating
rule by executive fiat.63 The Revolution of 1688 determined that the
legislative power in England should rest with the Parliament.6' The
power to suspend law, as well as to create it, is a legislative power. It
has been held, not without strong dissent, that even a legislature, created
by a written constitution, has no power to suspend the operation of that
constitution by enactments enabling the executive to rule by martial law.65
This is not in question here. The General Assembly of Indiana has
enacted no such legislation. The question involves the power of the gover-
nor in the absence of statutory authorization. The weight of authority
which argues for the constitutionality of martial law admits that the
power to initiate it does not lie with the executive.66 Surely the dictates of
good government demand that the representative assembly, rather than the
58. IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
59. IND. CONST. art. 5, § 12.
60. IND. CowsT. art. 1, § 33.
61. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
62. IND. CoNsT. art. 1, § 26.
63. Petition of Right, 1628, 3 CHAs. 1, C. 1; Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 WM. & MARY,
stat. 2, c. 2; Preamble to the Virginia Constitution (1776), 9 VA. STAT. AT LARGE, 112-13
(Hening 1821); Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), 9 VA. STAT. AT LARGE, 109 (Hening
1821) ; Declaration of Independence (1776).
64. See note 45 supra.
65. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). There is also Indiana authority
for this proposition. Skeen v. Monkeimer, 21 Ind. 1 (1863) ; Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind.
370 (1863). These opinions have been criticized as unreliable because they assume that a
state court may determine the legality of detention by federal authorities, and because
of the Copperhead sympathies of the court. WIENER, op. cit. supra note- 49, at 64 n. 8.
But the former point was not clarified until Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
The political turmoil in Indiana during the Civil War inevitably led to severe criticism
of the opinions rendered by the Democratic state Supreme Court. Note, Samuel E.
Perkins: A Judge in Politics, 28 InD. L. J. 106 (1952). The opinion in Griffin v.
Wilcox, supra, was rendered by Judge Perkins, a vociferousDemocrat. Although Perkins
obviously felt that his position on the bench should not forbid him access to the political
stump, he was a sound legal craftsman. His firm belief in the natural rights of man,
as reflected in decisions rendered during his judicial tenure, has profoundly influenced
Indiana constitutional law. Paulsen, Natural Rights-A Constitutional Doctrine in
Indiana, 25 IND. L. J. 123, 147 (1950).
66. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 132, 137 (1866) (concurring opinion);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46 (1849).
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recipient of emergency powers, decide whether the emergency exists." If
the crisis is not great enough to convince a legislature that martial rule is
necessary, it is not so acute as to demand a radical departure from normal
government for its control.
The actions taken by both state and federal governments to deal
with domestic crisis prior to the Civil War indicate the traditional limi-
tations on rule by martial law. Although military force was utilized on
several occasions to quell disorders of serious proportions, it was care-
fully kept within the bounds of assistance to civil authorities."8 Civil
process was enforced, not supplanted. Civil magistrates and judges
directed the actions of the troops and often accompanied them in the
field.6" The initiative remained with the civil authorities, and whatever
action was taken was accomplished through civil process."0 Moreover,
use of the troops to assist civil government was generally considered the
last recourse of a government in extremis, a step to be taken only after
all else had failed;71 use of the troops to supplant civil authority was
unthinkable." It is significant that in the one instance a state govern-
ment resorted to martial law prior to the Civil War, that government
was faced with a direct threat to its sovereignty and constitutional
structure.7" Furthermore, martial law was there initiated by the legisla-
ture, not the governor. 4 It is only after the doubtful precedent of rule
by martial law during the course of the Civil War that the phenomenon
67. ROssITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 299, 304 (1948).
68. E.g., in Shay's Rebellion (1786) the militia was placed under the direction of
the courts. The military had no initiative or discretion, but acted solely at the instance
of the civil authorities. MINOT, HISTORY OF THE INSURRECTIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE YEAR 1786, at 77, 95-96, 99-101 (1788). See also ADAMS, NEW ENGLAND IN THE
REPUBLIC 1776-1850 c. 6. Accounts of other early instances of the use of military power
in domestic crisis may be found in RICH, THE PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL DISORDER (1941) ;
RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS (1939); Federal Aid in. Domestic Disturbances,
S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1921).
69. E.g., in the Whiskey Insurrection (1794) the federal judge accompanied the
army, issuing warrants for the arrest of rebels along the way. BALDWIN, WHISKEY
REBELS 241 (1939) ; RICH, THE PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL DISORDER 15 (1941).
70. "The disposition of justice belongs to the civil magistrate, and let it ever be our
pride and our glory to leave the sacred deposit there unviolated." Letter from President
Washington to General Lee, Oct. 20, 1794, instructing him as to the conduct of the
army in the Whiskey Insurrection. 4 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES (2d ser.) 418-19.
71. See e.g., FINDLEY, HISTORY OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE FOUR WESTERN
COUNTIES OF PENNSYLVANIA 317 & App. I (1796). See also RICH, THE PRESIDENTS
AND CIVIL DISORDER 1-70 passim (1941).
72. See note 70 supra.
73. In Rhode Island, in 1842, where discontent with the franchise still in force
under the original Charter (1663) led to the formation of a rival state government.
MOWRY, THE DORR WAR 75-76 (1901); RICH, THE PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL DISORDER
54-66 (1941); RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS 26-34 (1939).
74. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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of martial law by executive proclamation became widespread."' But
President Lincoln's use of the military to supplant civil government in
the Northern states dealt with a governmental crisis the severity of
which has not been approached in the subsequent history of state govern-
ments. The action instituting martial law was held unconstitutional de-
spite the gravity of that crisis."6 It can have no value as precedent for
state martial law in disorders less severe.
The Indiaia General Assembly has indicated, by enacting legislation
regulating the use of troops in civil disorder, that these emergency
powers are vested in the governor only by dint of a legislative grant, the
source of power ultimately residing in the Assembly. The governor is
by statute authorized to order up the National Guard for state duty when-
ever he may deem it necessary."' He is to decide when a situation calls
for the presence of troops. But the manner in which the troops may be
utilized once on duty is limited. Although the exact extent of the dis-
cretionary powers granted by this legislation to control the activities of
the troops while on state duty is not clear, the statutes stop far short of
enabling the governor to rule by martial law. The military is granted no
power to supersede the civil authorities but is contemplated as acting in
close cooperation with them. The military is not to create law; it is to
operate within strict legal limits. The statutes outline the procedures to
be followed by the troops in dealing with civil disorder. The military
may arrest or use force to quell an unlawful assembly which has failed to
obey a command to disperse, or is engaged in actual violence to persons
or property."9 The means to deal with unlawful assembly are left to the
discretion of the military, but the occasion for their use is clearly de-
fined. On the other hand, the military is given discretionary power to
clear the streets and regulate their use, but the means to be employed are
strictly limited."0 The troops may arrest only those persons informed of
the regulations who refuse to depart the streets after they have been
ordered to do so. Moreover, such persons may not be confined by the
military, but must be turned over to a civil magistrate. Finally, the
commanding officer of the National Guard is authorized to take all neces-
75. For detailed coverage up to 1903, see Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances,
S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1921). A general history of rule by martial law in
the United States may be found in FAiRMAN, LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 81-94 (2d ed. 1943).
See also RANKIN, WHEN CmL LAW FAILs 65-136 (1939).
76. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
PRO1LEMS UNDER LINCOLN c. 7, 8 (2d ed. 1951).
77. IND. ANN. STAT. § 45-2104 (Burns Supp. 1955).
78. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 45-2107, 45-2108, 45-2110, 45-2115 (Burns Supp. 1955).
79. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 45-2108, 45-2110 (Burns Supp. 1955).
80. IND. ANN. STAT. § 45-2115 (Burns Supp. 1955).
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sary steps for the safety of his command should the Guard be in immi-
nent danger of attack."' These are the statutory powers of the Guard to
deal with civil disorder.
If the governor of Indiana has no residuary power to rule by martial
law, except where war or disorder may destroy the institutions of civil
government, it is clear that he has not been delegated this power by the
General Assembly. His discretionary power is restricted to calling up
the troops; their activities after mobilization are limited strictly by the
laws and constitution of Indiana. The National Guard is not a tool
through which the laws may be suspended; it is a force capable of en-
abling of the governor to insure that the laws are executed. As such,
the troops have the status of police officers.8 2 The National Guard is
well adapted to handle serious civil disorder, not because its presence
suspends the laws, but because its mobility, strength, and ready avail-
ability render it an effective auxiliary police force.
Categorizing the military with police officers does not necessarily
diminish its ability to deal with civil disturbance. Mere show of military
force is often sufficient to discourage lawlessness. Those serious dis-
orders which called for the use of troops in our earlier history were
handled without granting the military powers greater than those held by
the civil authorities.83 Moreover, the legal limitations on the powers of
peace officers tend to be flexible. Probable cause for warrant and ar-
rest is an elastic concept which may vary with circumstance.8 In reality,
orderly procedure is all that is required. Furthermore, the common law
has long recognized that even orderly procedure may be circumvented in
case of an emergency. 5 The threat of grave and impending danger may
81. IND. ANN. STAT. § 45-2112 (Burns Supp. 1955).
82. Middleton v. Denhardt, 261 Ky. 134, 87 S.W.2d 139 (1935) ; Franks v. Smith,
142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278
(1924) ; Fluke v. Canton, 31 Okla. 718, 123 Pac. 1049 (1912). See Ballantine's articles
on the subject: Martial Law, 12 COLUm. L. REV. 529 (1912); Military Dictatorship in
California and West Virginia, 1 CALIF. L. REV. 413 (1913); Unconstitutional Claims
of Military Authority, 24 YALE. L. REV. 189 (1914). But see Fairman, Martial Rule
in the Light of Sterling v. Constantine, 19 CORNELL L. Q. 20 (1933) ; WIENER, PRACTICAL
MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 74-77 (1941).
83. See note 68 supra.
84. EWBANK, INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW §§ 247-49 2d ed. 1929).
85. E.g., ship's cargo may be jettisoned to save the lives of passengers, Mouse's
Case, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B. 1608); buildings may be torn down to
stop the spread of fire, Conwell v. Emrie, 2 Ind. 35 (1850) ; see Hall and Wigmore,
Compensation for Property Destroyed to Stop the Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL. L.
REv. 501 (1907) ; levees may be cut to stop floods, Newcomb v. Tisdale, 62 al. 575 (1881) ;
private property may be impressed into public service under conditions of immediate
peril to the public interest, cf. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134-35 (1851).
While action taken by the military may be justifiable, that is for the courts to decide.
Sterling v. Constantine, 287 U.S. 378, 400-01 (1932) ; Mitchell v. Harmony, supra, at 134.
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justify actions normally illegal. To deny the power to rule by martial
law is not to deny the power to take effective action against emergencies,
but it does deny the military discretion to decide when and how effec-
tive action should be taken. Civil government, even in an emergency,
should rest with civil authorities. The National Guard is trained in
warfare, not police work. Its effectiveness stems from its manpower
and armament, not from its superior ability to handle routine police
duties. And if routine police work demands capable, highly trained
personnel, surely police work in domestic crisis requires direction by
equally capable men. 6 Effective government calls for expertise as :well
as force. Although military force may be required to quell civil dis-
order, it should be directed by those whose particular knowledge and
training in routine government has made them peculiarly suited for the
job. Domestic disturbance should be met with no greater disruption of
normal government and no greater use of power than is necessarily re-
quired to deal effectively with the situation.
The above considerations are primarily pertinent in determining the
ultimate source and extent of state power to deal with internal crisis,
as defined by the laws and constitution of Indiana. But insofar as the
exercise of that power affects individual rights through an abridgement
of due process of law and infringement of civil liberties, federal consti-
tutional problems are raised. The path to review in the federal courts
may be tortuous, but there is little doubt that it exists via the Fourteenth
Amendment."7 Although earlier federal cases reflected the confusion
surrounding martial law engendered by utilizing analogies of executive
prerogative and war powers, 8 the most recent consideration by the Su.
86. "The maintenance of order requires the use of experts and professionals who,
if democracy is to survive, must themselves be subordinated to popular control. Without
the experts, we cannot solve the difficult problems of aggression in modem society.
But unless the experts are subjected to the rule of law and other forms of popular control,
they become- an insensitive 6lite." Hall, -Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28
IND. L. J. 133, 176 (1953). It has been urged that police work, intelligently applied, can
nip an incipient riot in the bud. Id. 146-51.
87. "When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by that [U.S.] Constitution, the subject is necessarily
one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals
charged with 'the transgression. To such a case the Federal judicial power extends. .... "
Sterling v. Constantine, 287 U.S. 378, 398 (1932). Injunction, when appropriate, will
be granted. Sterling v. Constantine, supra. If the issue is the constitutionality of a statute
or regulation under which the state executive purports to act, then the action is properly
brought before a three judge district court, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281-2284 (1952). But if the allegation is that the governor has
acted uiltra vires in declaring martial law, then the normal system of proceeding through
the lower federal courts must be utilized. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1940).
88. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1849) ; U;S. ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 208 (D. Neb. 1922) ; U.S. ex rel.
McMaster v. Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (S.D. Texas 1920). Justice -Holmes' language
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preme Court of the United States of an attempt by a state executive to
rule by martial law clarified the problem. Brushing aside arguments of
absolute discretion and executive prerogative, in Sterling v. Constantine89
the Supreme Court declared that the legality of a governor's proclama-
tion of martial law which proposed to invade rights protected by the
federal Constitution was subjective to review. The test for legality
would seem to be the same as that for any state action touching constitu-
tional rights. The courts will consider the purpose of the action and
weigh the reasonableness of the means taken to effectuate that purpose
against the gravity of the invasion of individual rights." Necessity and
emergency may condition the reasonableness of the means, but they must
be proved. Rule by martial law is so drastic a means, and poses so grave
a threat to civil rights, that an extremely high measure of necessity must
be shown to justify its use.9 The court, therefore, will closely scru-
tinize the circumstances which provoked the governor's proclamation.
The opinion in Sterling v. Constantine left some doubt as to the
proper center of judicial focus in reviewing actions taken by the military
under martial law.92 A review centered solely around justification for
the governor's proclamation implies that complete suspension of law by
executive fiat might be proper under some circumstances. Logically,
therefore, it is conceivable under this theory that rule by martial law
might legally be invoked. According to this approach no action by the
military, however arbitrary or malicious, is subject to review if the initial
proclamation is held valid. However, if the specific activities of the
military are subject to the same test for legality as the governor's declara-
tion, protection against irresponsible invasions of civil rights is insured.
The Supreme Court has more recently declared that the civil courts
may not be suspended by resort to martial law by the federal govern-
ment.9" By so limiting the definition of martial law, the court has per-
in Moyer v. Peabody, supra, has justifiably been criticized. WIENER, PRACTICAL MANUAL
OF MARTIAL LAW 110 (1940).
89. 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
90. Id. at 399.
91. Id. at 401.
92. The case has been interpreted as giving conclusive value to the governor's
proclamation but not to orders issued under it. Fairman, Martial Ride in the Light of
Sterling v. Constantine, 19 CORNELL L. Q. 20, 33 (1933). Compare WIENER, PRACTICAL
MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 85-87 (1940).
93. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1945). The separate opinions in this
case run the gamut of judicial opinion on martial law. The majority opinion (Justice
Black) denies that martial law can mean anything more than military aid to civil author-
ities. The concurring opinion by Justice Murphy would allow martial law in its classic
sense only when the courts are unable to function. Chief Justice Stone's concurring
opinion would require a showing of necessity for both the executive proclamation and
actions taken under it. The dissent (Justice Burton, Justice Frankfurter concurring)
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mitted itself greater latitude in reviewing the justification for specific
action of the military at the scene of civil crisis. The attention of the
court is thus directed not only to the exigencies of the general situation,
but also to the reasonableness of the particular means taken to handle it.
To the federal courts, therefore, rule by martial law should present a
problem no different than that of any other state action subversive of
individual rights. The nature of permissible action by the National Guard
in dealing with civil disorder should be defined by its position as an arm
of state power and not by the status of the troops as a military force.
When the military contemplates overriding individual rights it must,
therefore, be guided by those judicial decisions outlining the permissible
scope of their invasion, and must be prepared to justify its action in
court. Unreasonable use of state power cannot be conjured into le-
gality simply by invoking the talisman of martial law.
Conclusion: The governor of a state has no power to rule by mar-
tial law. The governor's power to use the troops in civil disturbances
arises from his duty to see that the laws are executed. This duty does not
encompass the power to suspend civil government, but requires only the
use of that force necessary to quell lawlessness. In carrying out their mis-
sion the troops are bound to follow legal procedures. The extent of their
power is that of any peace officer acting under similar circumstances.
ARBITRATION OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSE BREACHES: AN
ANSWER TO SECTION 301 OF THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act labor unions are subject
to suit in federal courts for non-compliance with no-strike provisions in
collective bargaining agreements.1 Litigation of union liability is main-
tained despite provisions in the agreements for grievance and arbitration
procedures designed for the settlement of disputes arising between the
parties. The result may well mean invasion and frustration of the volun-
tarily established processes by which the parties have agreed to govern
their relations.
Some form of no-strike provision is included in more than 89 per
argues that martial law in a theater of war could be proclaimed at the discretion of the
President, and therefore is not subject to judicial review.
1. 61 STAT. 157 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
